MIA Facts Site

Report of the
Senate Select Committee
on
POW-MIA Affairs:
Appendix 6g

Private Groups Duker
12/02/92 Well more times than not it can't be
verified, so we have to pass it on as
that. This is an article that came
through to us and we could not verify
it with Government agencies as to
whether it was authentic or not.
That's how we pass it on. We
don't -- we won't say it's authentic
if we cannot prove that it is
authentic.

Private Groups Duker
12/02/92 So it puts us in a position of what
is the truth and what isn't. Where
else do we have to go to get
information but the Government. I
mean that's where the answers are, it
lies within your committee, it lies
within the Department of Defense, the
Defense Intelligence Agency. That is
the sources that we have. That's
where we have to go to try to verify
the information that we get, the
rumors, the speculation, and so
forth.

Private Groups Duker
12/02/92 ...there are just absolutely
thousands of pieces of information
out there that cannot be verified,
and so it does make our position
difficult in terms of our membership
because at times I think they may
think we are not pursuing it as
actively as we should, but we are.
But again, we will not pass on
information that we can't verify.

Private Groups Eddy
12/02/92 ...the Prisoner of War Committee of
Michigan operates as a nonprofit,
nonpartisan POW/MIA public awareness
organization. The committee's
primary source of income comes from
the sale of public awareness
merchandise. For example, bracelets,
pins, t-shirts, and flags, mostly
through mail order. The most
expensive item we have available for
sale are a lined Windbreaker jacket
and a 3 by 5 POW/MIA flag, each
priced at $30. The least expensive
is a small bumper sticker priced at
25 cents apiece...

In addition to the sale of public
awareness merchandise, the committee
occasionally receives donations from
veterans' organizations, concerned
citizens, and others who support the
work and the objectives of the group.

Private Groups Ford
11/15/91
...the people that really get hurt by
this are the families who have these
people coming around preying on their
uncertainties and their concerns
about their loved ones, and it ought
to stop. That's one reason we think
that this committee is one of the
best ideas going, because hopefully
we will get to the bottom of this.

Private Groups Ford
11/15/91 If I have ever seen a cover-up, this
is it. The fact is that what is being
covered up, for whatever reason, is
that Jack Bailey went to Southeast
Asia with our assistance, with our
hopes, with our prayers, and came up
empty.

Private Groups Gadoury
10/15/92 ...in addition to our own governments
efforts to search for information
about potential American POWs and
unaccounted for Americans, there were
a number of private American
individuals and organizations who
were engaged in similar activities,
some more extensively and in a more
organized fashion than others.

Private Groups Gadoury
10/15/92 While we work for a full accounting
of our missing and unaccounted for,
we should also demand a full
accounting from those who have
engaged in fabricating information to
further their personal or
organizational financial goals, and
at the same time falsely raising
hopes of the American people,
especially the families of our
missing and unaccounted for.

Private Groups Quinn
12/01/92 ...I think the need for some sort of
better mechanism to reach out to
other organizations, be they
veteran's organizations, other
POW/MIA, other family organizations,
who have often expressed to me and
raised the question about why they
are so far on the outside when others
are on the inside.

Private Groups Sampley
11/07/91 The pattern has continued. Rather
than focus all available resources on
resolving the problem of our missing
Vietnam veterans, much of the effort
has been directed toward destroying
the credibility and/or reputation of
the critics.

Private Groups Sheridan
12/02/92 The scholarship program that was
established in 1970 has become one of
the most important activities of the
organization. It provides
scholarship assistance to the
dependents of those uniformed
servicemen listed as missing in
action or killed in action who were
associated with the war in Southeast
Asia, as well as those uniformed
servicemen missing or killed in
action associated with armed conflict
through Operation Desert Storm.

Since 1971, when the first three
$1,000 grants were given, 613
scholarships totalling over $760,000
have been awarded. This year, 26
students alone were awarded
scholarships totalling $100,000...

The Red River Valley Fighter Pilots
Association has tax exempt status
under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. We are
eligible for contributions from the
Combined Federal Campaign under the
umbrella of the Independent Charities
of America. Other funds are derived
through annual membership dues,
contributions from the private
sector, local chapter fundraising
activities, and the generosity of the
American public.

We have never used the services of a
professional fundraiser.

Private Groups Steadman
12/02/92 I provided this committee with a
chronological summary of our public
efforts at influencing the Government
on this issue, but I'd like to just
highlight a few of our major efforts.

First, VFW has consistently urged
accelerating government-to-government
contact with Southeast Asian
countries in pursuit of the fullest
possible accounting. Second, we have
consistently held that it was a
legitimate function of our Government
and its duty to the families to
provide this accounting. Third, the
VFW has consistently maintained that
maximum economic and diplomatic
pressure should be exerted on the
Southeast Asian governments to obtain
their full cooperation in resolving
the fate of our missing men.

Since 1987 the VFW consistently
supported public release of more
information about our POW/MIAs and
since then we have consistently
called on the Government to increase
its efforts to recover our missing
men from the Korean War as well.
Finally, with the revelations of
Senator Helms and Senator Grassley
over a year ago and Colonel Peck's
allegations, we have supported a
public investigation of the
Government's handling of this
issue...

Concerning finances, we do not
solicit any funds for ourselves or
any other organization on the basis
of the POW/MIA issue, nor do we use
professional consultants as
fundraising organizations to do it
for us. The VFW supply department
sells POW/MIA flags and emblem
devices, but the monies derived are
quite small in comparison to our
overall sales. Private Groups Turner
11/07/91 It was apparent to me that there
existed the strong possibility that
actions by an agent of the U.S.
Government had deliberately killed a
viable operation to rescue American
prisoners of war, and I wanted to
find out what I could about it.

Remains Bell
12/04/92 Sen. McCain: Mr. Schweitzer said
that there was no American left,
there are no warehoused
remains...What is your view?

Mr. Bell: My view, sir, is that
there certainly was a warehouse in
the Hanoi area at one time. The
mortician, I think, after he defected
in 1979, he testified here in
Congress that he processed some 452
remains.

The Vietnamese were confronted with
that information. They denied it.
They indicated that they thought the
mortician was fabricating.

He actually provided about seven
different items of information. I
think six of those have been
verified...

The Vietnamese, I believe, came to
the conclusion that we were confident
that the man was telling the truth.
Since the mortician gave his
testimony, they have returned to us
approximately 450 remains.

Approximately 260 to 269 remains have
now been identified, and what that
indicates to me is...that we did have
a warehouse but we don't have one
now, and what that indicates to me is
that they have admitted that the
mortician was telling the truth.

They're telling us that we have given
you those remains back, and the
warehouse here in Hanoi is now empty.

Remains Bell
12/04/92 Sen. McCain: I think what you said
is a very important point here, and
if any of the other witnesses
disagree with that, that there is no
longer, in the view of the witnesses,
a warehouse of remains, but there is
in the view of the witnesses remains
that still need to be recovered, and
that's the job of the previous
witnesses, CINCPAC and you, Mr. Bell.
Is that accurate?

Mr. Bell: Yes, sir.

Remains Bell
12/04/92 Mr. Bell: Rather than concentrate on
numbers of cases, prioritized a list
where you have leads that can be
followed now, regardless of where the
case is in the country, and do the
cases that have the greatest
probability of success first, based
on those leads. And, at the same
time, have someone working on the
development of leads for those cases
for which you have no leads.

Chairman Kerry: That seems to make
sense.

Mr. Bell: To move the thing forward.

Chairman Kerry: Well, are we not
doing that in the context of having
put the toughest discrepancy cases in
front of them? I mean, General
Vessey sat there and put them there.

Mr. Bell: Yes, sir, we have, but
we're at a dead end on some of the
cases, and unless we come up with
some new information, it's pointless
to go back and investigate them
again.

Chairman Kerry: Are there a number
of cases on which we really know the
fate of people, but we just do not
have the remains?

Mr. Bell: Yes, sir.

Chairman Kerry: So, in effect, we
have really resolved some cases, but
we do not take them off the list
simply because we do not have
remains.

Mr. Bell: But there are also some
cases where we do not know the fate
of the individual and also do not
have remains or any possibility of
further leads in the case.

Remains Childress
08/12/92 ...Vietnam could solve the live
prisoner issue by returning their
remains. So the key question is, if
they're not alive, why is Vietnam not
solving it?

Remains Christmas
11/05/91 I think that it's unfair to our
people in the field to suggest that
their primary focus is on remains
recovery. We go where the facts lead
us as we identify each case and try
to follow it through for the fullest
possible accounting. If, in fact, the
facts lead us to the notion that we
can either recover the remains or
that we think the Vietnamese or
Laotians have those remains, we think
it's important as our accounting to
the families that we can give them
information.... They want them to
walk out of the jungle and come home,
but they will tell you very quickly
that if that can't be the case,
please end the uncertainty for me.
Give me something that I can put this
to rest, I've been with it so long.

Remains DeStatte
12/04/92 Mr. DeStatte: First, I doubt that
more than a few remains, if any, are
in the hands of private citizens in
Vietnam. It would be culturally
antithetical, as well as illegal.

Chairman Kerry: Well, let me just
ask you something. You know, there
is intelligence that -- I mean, some
people within your own house assert
that there are remains being held.

Mr. DeStatte: Yes, sir, I understand
that.

Chairman Kerry: You disagree with
that completely?

Mr. DeStatte: That's correct. I
acknowledge that there may be some
instances where private citizens may
have remains, but I think that that's
rare. I think that we should avoid
setting up a mechanism that
ultimately is simply a disguised
means of paying incentive rewards to
private citizens.

I think what we should be doing is
providing Vietnam's official organs,
such as we are doing with the
museums, means by which they can help
us find the answers we're looking for
and the return of the remains, and
rely on -- and also articulate, for
Vietnamese leaders, problems as we
understand those problems, and rely
on Vietnam and Vietnam's leaders to
resolve the internal problems of
recovering remains; to resolve the
internal problems of recovering
information and sharing that with us.
And I think that's the appropriate
approach, myself.

Remains Ford
12/04/92 ...I am struck by the fact that the
cases that bother me, that gnaw away
at me on this issue, is the cases
that they should know the most about:
the ones where we have the
photographs of people on the ground
dead in Vietnamese control, the last
known alive cases that we've
investigated that they had custody of
them, based on our joint
investigations.

Those are the ones that are not
showing up. Now, I can understand,
as some have said, that they've lost
the coordinates, a bomb went off and
when they went back to get them they
didn't find them, somebody took them
home when they retired as a gold bar,
they were going to sell them back to
somebody at some time in the future.

I can understand that for, give me a
number, 25 percent, 40 percent, but
not all of the most likely cases
where we know they had control over
an American that was dead on the
ground. They don't lose them all.

Remains Ford
12/04/92 Mr. Ford: ...I remember being told
two years ago in Hanoi: There are no
archives; we have no archives; why
would we not give them to you if we
had them? They have been eaten up.

Chairman Kerry: I remember that.
Vessey spoke to that, though.

Mr. Ford: But why is that different
than the remains?

Remains Ford
12/04/92 This is one that I have a nightmare
about, and that's that something Carl
Ford will say or do to his superiors
will give the Vietnamese the
impression that they don't have to
give us those remains and they
destroy them, they get rid of them.

I shuddered when all of the people
told the truth as they saw it today,
because if the message ever gets to
the Vietnamese that the U.S.
Government believes they don't have
remains we aren't going to get any.
And I just can't for the life of me -
- I will err on the side of trying to
provide the answers for the families
as long as I can. That's my bias.

Remains Ford
12/01/92 The fact is that every piece of
evidence that we have gotten in the
breakthrough suggests that they do
have far more information than they
have provided thus far, that they, in
fact, have to explain to us if they
do not have the remains, why not.

Remains -
Excavations Gadoury
12/04/92 Chairman Kerry: What did you pull
out of this crash site?

Gadoury: The aircraft involved was
an AV/OV-2, which crashed into the
side of a mountain. It's scattered
over a large area. The exact
dimensions were -- I don't recall the
exact dimensions, but it was over 100
meters wide, and probably about the
same distance going from the bottom
of the slope up a 60 degree slope to
the top. And there was a wide
distribution of wreckage.

As we started going, meticulously
following the Identification
Laboratory's excavation procedures
from the bottom to the top --

Chairman Kerry: So, you literally
began to sift through soil, right?

Gadoury: Right.

Chairman Kerry: You would sift
through soil, and you would clean it
out, and you would find fragments of
bone; you would find fragments of
teeth.

Gadoury: On this last situation, we
were not able to finish the site, but
we found over 300 bone fragments, and
a number of teeth, and quite a few
personal effects and personal
equipment.

Remains Larson
12/04/92 General Needham said that -- and I do
not want to misquote him, but the
impression I had is that he believes
that there are remains that are known
to exist being held by individuals,
as well as perhaps local government
officials. There is some
expectation, of course, that some
bounty would be paid for remains. We
have made it clear that that is not
the policy of the United States.

Remains Larson
12/04/92 ...There are remains somewhere,
because we have photographs of bodies
that they had at one time that we do
not have remains for. So there are
some that once were available that we
do not have, and we don't know where
they are.

Remains Needham
12/04/92 Sir, the one area that I don't know
what to tell you is the answer to the
remains. I can give you a scenario
that Morrissey was buried in an area
and maybe they lost the records.
However, we are working with them and
we have presented those cases to
them. We're going to talk to them
more about it next week.

I believe, as Admiral Larson said,
they are trying to find a way to get
themselves out of this situation,
because they are concerned about the
laws. They're also concerned about
taking remains from individuals and
convincing them that they have no
chance of getting any money somewhere
down the road.

Remains Schweitzer
12/04/92 Sen. McCain: Mr. Schweitzer, I asked
General Vessey this morning on the
issue of the allegation of the
warehousing of remains. One, have
you seen any evidence of warehousing
of remains? And, two, what is your
opinion about that theory that there
may be several hundred American
remains kept somewhere in Hanoi, or
somewhere in Vietnam?

Mr. Schweitzer: There is no such
warehouse, sir. If, at one point in
the '70's or early '80's, if there
were some remains somewhere in Hanoi,
those remains have by now, as the
officials retired who were in the
program, as they went back to their
provinces, various memorabilia, maybe
even remains, have gone back with
them. And while there may have been
some remains at some point -- I don't
know that, but if there were, they
are now in private hands.

Sen. McCain: You are absolutely
convinced there is no warehouse for
the large number of U.S. remains
somewhere in Hanoi?

Mr. Schweitzer: Yes, sir. There is
no such warehouse.

Remains Schweitzer
12/04/92 Mr. Schweitzer: Well, after our
meeting I had meetings with the
Vietnamese all that day, and into the
night... the importance of this
historic trip of yours to Vietnam
[was stressed], and what could be
achieved during this trip.

And I was told to me that they simply
have no remains. That if the success
or failure of this trip and of
establishing relations with the U.S.
is dependent upon their turning over
the remains they have in their
possession, or that is believed they
have in their possession, then it's
going to fail. They have no remains.

Now, I don't mean to indicate to you
that there are not remains out there.
There are, and the investigators that
are there, the analysts are going to
get them as the people of Vietnam --

Chairman Kerry: But you are
suggesting those are the ones in
private hands?

Mr. Schweitzer: Private hands.

Chairman Kerry: Or in provincial
hands.

Mr. Schweitzer: Or, possibly, that
haven't been excavated yet. The
location of the grave sites is known
by -- you were given the example by
Colonel Dai, a very vivid example.
He knows the location of four graves.

Remains Schweitzer
12/04/92 Sen. McCain: You do not disagree
with that, Mr. Schweitzer, that there
are remains in different parts of the
country.

Mr. Schweitzer: I wouldn't disagree
with anything Bill Bell says. He's
the real expert on this.

Remains Schweitzer
12/04/92 However, this does not mean that
remains, or even partial remains may
be found for most of these cases.
The majority of the remaining MIA
cases in Vietnam may eventually be
resolved by means of other factors.
These will include photos, documents,
aircraft wreckage, memorabilia, and
personal stories told by a farmer, a
People's Army Vietnam soldiers, and
civilians.

Remains Vessey
11/05/91
. . . U.S. analysts have combined
these facts to build a case which
suggests that the Vietnamese
government could be holding as many
as several hundred sets of remains.

Remains Vessey
12/04/92 ...for example, if there were an air
crash they were to find -- the local
people were to find the crash, find
the pilot if he were alive, capture
him; if he wasn't alive, find the
remains then bury them on the stop
and then report the location of those
-- of the grave to the central
authorities. And then the central
authorities clearly had a system for
recovering those remains at a later
date, one, two, or five years later,
and then sending those remains to
central storage.

Remains Vessey
06/25/92 In the past five years we've received
332 sets of remains... Of those, 125
have been identified and returned to
their families. Another 107 might be
those of Americans, but have not yet
been identified, and the remaining
100 sets are not remains of missing
Americans.

In the 119 discrepancy cases which
have been the focus of our joint
field investigations, 22 have been
resolved through recovery, return and
identification of remains. In 39
other sets we and the Vietnamese have
agreed that the individuals involved
are dead which confirms an earlier
presumptive finding of death. in four
of those cases we agree that we will
not be bale to recover remains.

For the other 35 of those cases we
believe that there still may be an
opportunity to recover the remains...
The other 58 cases continue to be
investigated. They all have been
investigated at least once and most
several times... none of the new
evidence gathered... points toward
any of the individuals being alive.

Remains Vessey
11/05/91
...U.S. analysts have combined these
facts to build a case which suggests
that the Vietnamese government could
be holding as many as several hundred
sets of remains.

Reparations Kissinger
09/22/92 ...we did not want to create the
impression of ransom and reparations.

Reparations Kissinger
09/22/92 The North Vietnamese, in what turned
into a constant pattern, immediately
began to violate the agreement,
especially with respect to a full
accounting of MIAs. They did not
hand over the POW list for Laos as
required on January 27th.

In response, we delayed deliveries to
them of the confidential Presidential
letter on recommending to Congress
reconstruction assistance after peace
had been established. The letter was
kept confidential only to prevent a
linkage between the agreement and
what we presented as a unilateral
American act. A Presidential report
to the Congress in February 1972 had
affirmed this undertaking, and have a
figure of $2.5 billion. It was again
repeated in the Presidential speech
of May 8, 1972. Mr. Chairman, some
suggestions have been made, including
this morning, that the North
Vietnamese may have withheld some
American prisoners in an effort to
get this economic aid. I find this
reasoning difficult to understand.

Reparations Kissinger
09/22/92 I don't believe that reparations were
their primary objective. Their
primary objective was to take over
Indochina, and if all they had wanted
from us was economic aid, all they
would have had to do was observe the
agreement...

Reparations Kissinger
09/22/92 I certainly told them innumerable
times that we were not paying ransom,
we were not paying reparations, and
they have never used it. They never
said, you owe us economic aid, and
therefore we are holding prisoners.
If they had done it, I wouldn't have
been astonished.

Reparations Kissinger
09/22/92 To encourage compliance with these
commitments we held out the
inducement first offered by President
Johnson in 1965, and frequently
reiterated since, at least three
times by President Nixon in 1972, of
economic aid to North Vietnam.

Reparations Kissinger
09/22/92 Finally, it is curious that Americans
would make such an argument when the
North Vietnamese did not. As the
bipartisan House Select Committee
reported in 1976, not once in all
their discussions with the North
Vietnamese, did they cite the
American failure to provide economic
aid as an excuse for their failure to
provide a complete accounting. They
have never denied their obligations.
They have only denied that they have
prisoners.

Why should Americans now put forward
an alibi for Hanoi which even Hanoi
has never asserted?

Reparations Robson
09/24/92 Vice Chairman Smith: ...Dr. Kissinger
was very clear about that -- no
linkage. Now, why would they bail
out if they did not feel there was
linkage?

Colonel Robson: I know there was not
supposed to be any linkage, Senator,
but in fact there was. They were
constantly trying to link things...

Vice Chairman Smith: Is Dr.
Kissinger wrong in that perception?

Colonel Robson: I know that he had
the agreement, the understanding that
there would be no linkage. But what
happens in Washington and what
happens in that little dusty room in
Saigon is two different things,
Senator.

Reparations Smith
09/22/92 [Habib] said in one of the first
lists of negotiating points put
forward by the North Vietnamese, "The
communist side bracketed the release
of prisoners with what they described
as U.S. responsibility for war damage
in Vietnam in a single numbered
point. I know of no instance in
which an adversary so openly treated
this humanitarian problem in this
way. We recognized from an early
date what we were up against."

Reparations Walters
09/21/92 ...My understanding was this is what
they really wanted from us, the
postwar reconstruction aid and
obviously they knew what we really
wanted from them short of surrender
was the prisoners.

Returned POWs Ford
12/01/92 Vice Chairman Smith: I think one
area that could be very helpful and,
frankly, it has been a real problem,
is the POW debriefs. Not regarding
anything in there other than the
names of individuals that they saw.
I have only -- we are restricted to
the Chairman and myself. There are
590 of them, and it is impossible to
get through those with the two of us
doing it...

Ford: Is there any possibility that
as a compromise, Senator Smith, that
you might allow us to go through that
and do this work ourselves? I mean
part of this is a contract that we
have. It's not a legal contract, but
it's certainly a contract in
principle, not only to the past POWs
but any future POWs.

That when we talk to them after they
come back, we know that they've been
through hell. We don't expect them
to be anything other than human but
we want to know, we need to know what
happened to them. And we've always
made it clear in that process that
these would be guarded as sort of
nuclear weapons secrets or something,
and that's the reason that we've done
that.

Returned POWs Trowbridge
06/24/92 I know of no prisoners that came home
that said, I saw an individual that
was alive that we left behind,
without other information that may
have supported the fact that he died.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 ... in 1990... I broke with the KGB
and went public and denounced the
organization as cruel, repressive and
inhuman... What I am doing now is
simply a continuation of my old
story, for which I was sued... and
deprived of my rank and pension and
everything else. So I am not doing
anything new...

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 Chairman Kerry: ...can you help us
to understand why Mr. Nechiporenko
allegedly said one thing to you at
one moment and straight-out denies
that he talked to anybody
subsequently? Do you have an
explanation for that?

General Kalugin: ...my explanation
is that he had consulted his former
superiors and they would tell him,
just say one... I think that's a
premeditated lie on the part of the
former intelligence organization, and
I know the reason... Vietnam remains
to be probably one of the last
listening posts in the Far East, and
to lose a relationship with them...
would probably be a major setback for
the Soviet intelligence, so why not
keep a story which was coordinated
with the Vietnamese?

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 ... I do care about people at home.
I'm not a defector. I'm a citizen of
my country. I love my country. I want
to stay in that country. I want to
change that country and transform it
into something far better than we
have today or we had in the last 70
years. And the United States, as I
know it, is a country which I always
felt friendly for and I will do my
best to get both countries closer
together and get Russia out of this
mess and standing on its feet as a
proud nation, a prosperous nation.
That's my only desire.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 ...to take any American against his
will to the USSR would require a
major political decision by the
Politburo and Brezhnev personally...
They would never risk [the damage to
Soviet/American relations... It makes
no practical sense, no political or
military sense. They could have been
interviewed on the spot and that made
sense indeed.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 I do have a lot of obligations
[regarding confidentiality],
according to the old rules, but I
think it's time to set new rules.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 The GRU is an autonomous organization
and the KGB's role in regard to the
military intelligence is to protect
this agency from foreign intelligence
agencies' penetration, and second, to
control their political health, so to
speak. That was the major role of the
KGB. Otherwise, they would act
autonomously, do their things without
the KGB's knowledge.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 At least for us, for [American POWs]
to go would be the best thing,
because we would have probably some
potential sources. To keep them in
Vietnam, it's a loss of everything,
it's a complete failure as an
intelligence operation.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 Two years ago, or about that time, I
said publicly that the KGB was a
state within a state which would do
everything to disrupt the process of
democratization in my country. I was
denounced as a liar, as a mental jerk
or something, and I was stripped of
my honors and everything, but one-
and-a-half years later, Mr.
Gorbachev, after his return from the
Crimea, said the same -- the KGB was
a state within a state -- and he
confirmed what I has said previously.
. . . everything that I have said so
far found at a later time
confirmation.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 I am sure that [Soviet military
interrogation of U.S. POWs] happened,
because they did have a major
interest in American know-how, in
weaponry, details, instructions. This
would be a natural thing to expect,
but this is my assumption. I do not
say that this really happened.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92
I would reject the idea of American
POWs taken to the Soviet Union. We
don't have to take them to the Soviet
Union. They could have been
interrogated in Vietnam. The
Vietnamese wanted us to interrogate
them... to take any American against
his will to the USSR would require a
major political decision by the
Politburo and Brezhnev personally...
They would never risk, because of one
or a handful of Americans, to be
taken inside to damage the
Soviet/American relations... It makes
no practical sense, no political or
military sense. They could have been
interviewed on the spot and that made
sense indeed.

Soviet Union Kalugin
01/21/92 Sen. Reid: Why couldn't your story be
a continuation of the intrigue,
deceit and lies and destroying
records that you were involved in for
some 32 years?

General Kalugin: Well, it makes no
sense. I am 57 and I've lived a very
interesting life. Today I want to
live a different life, just an honest
and simple [one]. You may believe
it -- as I say, take it or leave it.

Soviet Union Kerry
01/21/92 General Kalugin's startling account
has been disputed by the Government
of Vietnam, discounted by the CIA and
denied outright by the KGB agent who
allegedly carried out the interviews.
This conflict between statement and
denial is precisely the type of
situation the Committee expects to
run into time and time again. Our
intent is to build as complete a
record as we can, to take neither
allegations nor denials at face
value, to contact original sources
whenever possible, and to locate
contemporaneous documentation
wherever it exists. We cannot, in
this way, be sure of arriving at the
truth, but we can be certain that we
have left no avenue unexplored in our
pursuit of the truth.

Soviet Union Kohl
11/15/91 What happens in 41 years that we do
not go back and re-inquire and ask
whether or not there is some
information that would be useful?..
We inquired about many, many people
in the Soviet Union about whom we
were concerned -- Soviet Jewry,
rightfully so, Raoul Wallenberg and
many others. Why were we not at the
same time asking consistently about
POWs and missing POWs in the Soviet
Union that we did not have any
information on, or inadequate
information on?

Soviet Union Mooney
01/22/92 The interest in Moscow Bound is
totally surprising to me... It's an
intelligence given... The Soviets do
take our people... Unlike World War
II and Korea, the Soviets did not
need a bunch of people for labor.
They were after the minds... They
were not stealing them by the
hundreds. They were few and rare.

Soviet Union Shields
06/25/92 Some early releases came home from
Vietnam via Moscow, but we never had
any indication that prisoners were
transferred to the Soviet Union and
detained there.

Soviet Union Smith
01/21/92 General Kalugin's comments have
produced admissions from the CIA, the
KGB, and even Vietnam, that at least
one American POW was interrogated by
the Soviets. For seven years, I was
told just the opposite.

Soviet Union Vessey
06/25/92 Vessey: And Colonel Nechiporenko who
was Kalugin's source, said that isn't
what I told Kalugin. I told him I
interviewed one person in 1973... The
Vietnamese say yes, that's what
happened... Now, surely the Soviets
gave questions to the Vietnamese.
There are al sorts of information
that the Soviets desperately wanted
from our people, and surely they had
worked out some sort of arrangement
to try to get that information from
our people. As far as we know, from
debriefing the prisoners returned,
none of them reported having been
interrogated by the Soviets. There
were some Cubans involved, but none
were interrogated by Soviets.

Senator Kassebaum: Any Chinese?

Vessey: And so far as I know, none
by the Chinese.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Sen. Grassley: Mr. Andrews, I want
to ask about Morse code K. DIA
determined that the Dong Manh
facility was a re-education center,
yet the CIA analysis shows it to be
one of the most security facilities
that they have seen, and we have had
reference to that in the CIA memo.
Can you back up your assessment and
indicate to us why the CIA's analysis
is wrong?

Mr. Andrews: Senator, as I said in
my statement and in subsequent
questions already, that initial
analysis was their best estimate at
the time. This was mad prior to the
extensive interviews we have had of
inmates of the facility where we got
a lot more information on the
security and the nature of the
facility. That's our best judgment.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 The USA and possible K remain
unexplained despite extensive tasking
of information collection activities
of the intelligence community. No
correlation to a know, unaccounted
for individual -- to a known,
unaccounted for individual -- has
been made. And unless an unexpected
lead develops, there is little more
that can be done other than
continuing to monitor the situation.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: Now that, to
say the least, is pretty outrageous,
based on this Senator's opinion. You
teach people to communicate, you
teach them how to communicate, you
teach them what to communicate with,
and then you do not keep the number
so that you can identify them when
they communicate. You are going to
have a hell of a job identifying
them, are you not?

Mr. Andrews: Absolutely.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Every image that I am aware of that
we have taken, we've analyzed and the
committee has been made aware of, and
we've talked about today...

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 ...of all the millions of square
kilometers of territory in Southeast
Asia that we've examined over the
years, we really only have two
unexplained sets of symbols which
were clearly intended to communicate
something to an observer from above.
And that's the 19 or 1573 TH and the
USA with the possible K.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: ...let us
assume that a number appears on a
photograph. Let us assume that you
cannot make any determination any
way, shape, or form, that thing was
created by a natural object. Your
analysts say there is nothing that we
can find anywhere in any of the
imagery in any way we analyze this,
that in any way that this number that
we see was made by natural objects.

You then see that number. What is
going to be your recommendation if
you cannot determine for sure that it
was a man-made object? What is going
to be your recommendation? What are
you going to do?...

Mr. Andrews: Sir, I will offer you a
personal opinion. We always, when we
have reason to believe that something
may be an indicator, we follow up, as
Mr. Erickson says or as Mr. Dussault
said. The first thing you do is go
collect more information. So that's
exactly what we would do. Until we
could resolve it, we would follow up.
And that's what we've done with these
others.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 I think that it's -- it's very hard
when you're trying to go back a
number of years to try to put
yourself in the place of an imagery
analyst or an analyst in that time
frame tho know why he concluded what
he concluded. We've done the best we
could, at the committee's request, to
reexamine all this imagery and bring
in multiple people to look at it.
And what we looked at, we saw a
possible 52 that we believed we could
explain.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Mr. Andrews: If there was a number
on the ground that an escaped
prisoner made and we detected it, we
would not dismiss it until we had
done everything we could to resolve
what the case was.

Vice Chairman Smith: Well, you may
not be able to.

Mr. Andrews: Well -- and that's our
problem. So we keep it unexplained.
It would immediately go on my
unexplained list, Senator Smith.

Vice Chairman Smith: Well, it sits
on the unexplained list, what happens
to the poor guy down there that is
making the number?

Mr. Andrews: Senator, we do
everything we can with the resources
available to us to follow up on these
various numbers.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Viewing a poor-quality print with a
magnifying glass is just not how
imagery exploitation should be
done...When the JSSA personnel viewed
the original quality imagery of the
printed photography on a light table
using high resolution optics the
nature of all the supposed evader
symbols became clear.

They were simply vegetation, shadows,
or artifacts of the photography
production process. Some possible
symbols were even in the tops of 200
foot tall tress, an unlikely place
for an evading POW to leave a signal.
When shown photographs of other
locations -- and I think this is very
significant -- other locations in
Africa and one in Utah, the JSSA
personnel also saw the same kinds of
symbols, symbols which again
disappeared on the light table.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 No one -- not DIA, not CIA, and not
the JSSA -- can correlate the USA and
possible K symbols to an unaccounted-
for individual.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: ...in spite of
all that information, in spite of the
fact that they were taught to provide
identifying information to imagery
from above, we do not have the list
of those identifier numbers to find
them if they signal. Is that
correct?...

Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir. As far as I
know right now, yes, sir.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: I think the
laws of probability would indicate to
you that if there are a series of
numbers that identify with an
individual or individuals who are
missing in action in Southeast Asia
and those numbers correlate with
individuals, the laws of probability
would tell you that it is a very high
probability that those people are, in
fact, identified with those numbers.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: Is it your
position that these symbols are --
well, to use the term, is it your
position that what you say on the
imagery is valid until proven
otherwise?

Mr. Andrews: Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman Smith: Is it your
position, as well?

Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 ...the other point that Senator Smith
made that I would like to respond to
regarding circling the wagons and
directed that everybody get in
line...

None of the players, and you have
deposed them on this particular
subject, none of the players were
asked or directed or forced in anyway
to change their minds...

We simply brought them together so
that we could better serve the
committee. We're not circling the
wagons. We want to get the
information to you. We believe
there's a good story to tell if we
get the accurate information and not
the incomplete information on the
table.

Symbols Andrews
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: ...nobody said
to this Committee when we showed you
this [information on symbols], thank
you... We will take a look at that.
Maybe we missed something. That is
not what we heard.

What we heard was immediately
circling the wagons, pulling
everybody together, saying we will
have one position on this. No one is
to talk to the committee. We will
have one position to the committee,
and we are telling you now that
position is that those are not
symbols and those people are not
missing. And I find it outrageous
that is the way this issue is being
treated...

Andrews: Senator, if I could, first
of all, we do take them very
seriously. When the USA came to our
attention, we had an analyst on an
airplane within a couple of days to
Southeast Asia to try to follow-up on
actions that we could take to
determine what was there. We
collected additional intelligence
information and continued that
process.

Symbols Chagnon
10/15/92 Ms. Chagnon: The gentleman here
before us said that here was one
possibility of these being written by
POWs, one being that it was a ruse by
resistance people. Those letters
could be Lao letters.

Vice Chairman Smith: What would it
say in Lao? Does it say anything?

Ms. Chagnon: ...it could be ba ra
hoi, which means don't wait. It
could be the abbreviation for those
three words...I have a Lao friend
staying with us...I said what would
these letters stand for if you saw
them anywhere, and she immediately
picked out ba ra hoi...  He also stated under oath, that
although Committee investigators
suggested he contact JSSA to become
educated in the distress symbol
program, he did not arrange for such
a briefing until June; page 21.

Symbols Clapper
12/01/92 The joint investigation team
travelled to Sam Nuea Province on 29
November '92, located the rice field
where the USA symbol was made,
interviewed it's owner, and
discovered that the owner's eldest
son made the USA symbol by copying it
from an envelope because he liked the
shape of the letters.

Symbols Dussault
10/15/92 Sen. Grassley: Mr. Dussault, did you
also think that you saw a name
faintly scratched in the field?

Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.

Sen. Grassley: Without telling us
the name, did you try to match it
with the names on the missing list?

Mr. Dussault: About three days
later, yes, sir. At first I didn't
realize it was a name.

Sen. Grassley: Did it match any
names?

Mr. Dussault: To my recollection, it
did.

Symbols Dussault
10/15/92 And in this case, in my mind, it's a
possibility that the individual may
have tried over the last 15 years
various signals. None of those got
any attention, so he's going to go
with a blatant USA.

Symbols Dussault
10/15/92 Chairman Kerry: And it has the
walking appearance, whatever that
extra -- I don't want to get into any
classified area. Do you believe it's
distinctly a K?

Mr. Dussault: It to me looks like a
K, and that's how I think we ought to
consider it. And I've said that in
writing, I think, and I've really
done that for a reason. My position
is...Give the benefit of the doubt to
the operator. That's always been my
concern. Symbols Dussault
10/15/92 Sen. Grassley: Did you see, 72 TA
88?

Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir. To my
recollection that's what I saw.

Sen. Grassley: How did you interpret
that?

Mr. Dussault: At first, my first
interpretation of that is -- 72 was
the year the guy went down. TZ was
his E&E code letters. And 88 could
have been the year he arrived there
or the year he left. And that was my
interpretation. I don't know if
that's even close. That's just
speculation.

Symbols Dussault
10/15/92 Sen. Grassley: When you saw 72 TA
88, did it match a person that was
missing?

Mr. Dussault: Sir, again, we are
talking a year, two letters, TA --
and those are E&E code letters that
applied during 1972.

Sen. Grassley: when you found the
name, though, did it match when that
person went down?

Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.

Symbols Dussault
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: ...we cannot
assume that is made while the person
is in captivity, can we? The person
could have escaped, is that not
correct?

Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir, that is
correct.

Vice Chairman Smith: And made it
while he was escaping?

Mr. Dussault: Yes, that's one of the
possibilities. He could be an
escapee hiding out in that area, made
a K, went back into hiding, for a
couple of weeks, stayed close by,
within a kilometer, which is his
training, and then goes back and does
the USA. Again, maybe even at night,
under a moonlit night, or something
like that, he gets out there and
works for three hours.

Symbols Dussault/
Erickson
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: ...we have an
agency that teaches pilots escape and
evasion procedures and identifying or
authenticating numbers in order to
locate them. Those people who taught
that were not sent any imagery until
at least, at the minimal, 1985; most
of it was seen after this committee
showed it to them in 1992. Is that
correct?

Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.

Mr. Erickson: Yes. Symbols Elder
10/15/92 Vice Chairman Smith: ...If you could
remove yourself from what you heard
here this morning, did you ever hear
any information from anybody
regarding that, any indigenous person
in Laos or anybody else who was in
Laos regarding the USA?

Mr. Elder: I did not. Symbols Erickson
10/15/92 Chairman Kerry: Now, we have
discussed this previously, and this
is not classified. But how long
would it take a person to dig out a
USA of that size?

Mr. Erickson: At least and hour per
letter for one individual.

Chairman Kerry: So, three hours of
work?

Mr. Erickson: At least.


 

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